



Information Flow Tracking & Checking for OTBN Assembly

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Motivation

The OpenTitan Big Number coprocessor (OTBN) accelerates cryptographic operations on highly sensitive data. To keep these operations safe against side-channel attacks, the assembly code must obey strict secure coding guidelines: how registers are cleared, which instructions may follow each other, and where transitional leakage can occur. Such rules are derived from hardware leakage analyses with tools like Coco-Alma.

Today, checking that a piece of OTBN assembly actually respects these rules is done by hand. That is slow, tedious, and error-prone, and it does not scale to real implementations such as ECDSA or RSA. We want this check to run automatically, so that a software update cannot silently break the security guarantees of the hardware.

Goals and Tasks

- 💡 Define how secret shares are annotated and tracked in OTBN assembly
- ✂ Extend the Python OTBN instruction set simulator with dynamic taint analysis
- ✂ Build a module that checks the resulting information flow against the Coco-Alma guidelines
- 💡 Evaluate the tool on OpenTitan implementations (e.g., ECDSA, RSA): violations found, false positives

Literature

- > [B. Gigerl et al.](#)
Coco: Co-Design and Co-Verification of Masked Software Implementations on CPUs
[USENIX Security 2021](#)
<https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/gigerl>
- > [lowRISC](#)
OpenTitan Big Number Accelerator (OTBN) Technical Specification
<https://opentitan.org/book/hw/ip/otbn/>

Courses & Deliverables

☒ Master Project

Project code
Report
Presentation

– OR –

☒ Master's Thesis

Initial presentation
Project code
Thesis (60+ pages)
Final presentation

Recommended if you're studying

☒ CS ☒ ICE ☒ SEM

Prerequisites

- > Solid Python, some assembly
- > Interest in side-channel countermeasures (no prior knowledge needed)

Advisor Contact